Case Law Update - September 2012 - March 2013

State v. Ramirez, 2012 UT 59 (Justice Lee)

Ramirez invited police officers to search his motel room for a clean glass pipe, suggesting the pipe would "clear his name."  After finding the pipe, officers asked for permission to continue searching the room.  Ramirez consented and asserted that officers would find nothing else.  Nevertheless, officers located methamphetamine and paraphernalia in a trash bag, as well as a prescription bottle with Ramirez's name on it.  Although officers did not find property belonging to anyone besides Ramirez, the investigating officer acknowledged that others may have had access to the room.  At preliminary hearing on possession and paraphernalia charges, the magistrate refused to bind Ramirez over for trial, ruling that the reasonable inference from the evidence was that Ramirez was not aware of the drugs and paraphernalia in his room.

The Supreme Court reversed.  The Court held that the evidence gave rise to an alternative reasonable inference: that Ramirez knew of the drugs and paraphernalia, but believed they would have been thrown away before police searched the room.  Where evidence at preliminary hearing gives rise to more than one reasonable inference, the Court held, a magistrate is required to favor the inference supporting probable cause.

State v. Verde, 2012 UT 60 (Justice Lee)

Verde was convicted of sexually abusing a twelve-year-old boy.  The trial court admitted evidence under Rule 404(b) that Verde had previously sexually abused two eighteen-year-old men.  The court ruled that this evidence was relevant as: 1) proof of Verde's specific intent; and 2) proof of Verde's general plan to sexually assault young men.  The Court of Appeals affirmed based on the "not guilty rule," under which intent is placed at issue any time a defendant pleads not guilty to a specific-intent crime.

The Supreme Court reversed and rejected the "not guilty rule."  Although acknowledging that all elements of a crime are technically placed at issue by a not-guilty plea, the Court reaffirmed that trial courts always have a duty to evaluate the true purpose of other bad acts evidence.  As Verde had not contested his intent at trial, and intent was readily inferable from the act Verde was accused of committing, other bad acts were not admissible to prove it.

The Court also declined to adopt a rule of admissibility for other bad acts evidence showing a "general plan" to commit crimes.  Particularly where the victim of the charged assault was a minor and the victims of the uncharged conduct were adults, the uncharged conduct was not admissible under Rule 404(b) to show a general plan to sexually assault young men.

The Court ultimately remanded the case for a new trial, but left the door open for the State to offer the 404(b) evidence under the "doctrine of chances."  The Court explained that this doctrine can provide for admission of evidence of other conduct similar to the charged conduct.  From such evidence a jury to may permissibly conclude that the victim of the charged conduct probably did not fabricate his testimony, based on the logical improbability of multiple victims fabricating similar stories.  The four foundational requirements that must be met before evidence offered under the doctrine of chances should be admitted to prove an actus reus are 1) materiality, 2) similarity, 3) independence and 4) frequency.

State v. Moore, 2012 UT 62 (Justice Nehring)

Moore was charged with aggravated sexual abuse of a child (under age 14), a first degree felony, and dealing in material harmful to a minor, a second degree felony.  The same incident gave rise to both charges.  The alleged victim gave inconsistent statements as to whether he was 13 or 14 at the time of the incident, and defense counsel did not consult with Moore about this discrepancy or emphasize it at trial.  Moore was convicted.

On appeal, the State conceded that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance as to the aggravated sexual abuse of a child.  However, although the State conceded that defense counsel's performance was deficient as to the dealing in material harmful to a minor charge, it argued that Moore was not prejudiced by such performance because the difference between ages 13 and 14 was irrelevant to that charge.

The Court held that the second prong of Strickland was met and Moore was prejudiced.  Although the alleged victim's age was irrelevant to the harmful material charge, the Court held that because the two charges occurred arose from the same incident, the harmful material charge was inseparable from the aggravated sexual abuse of a child charge.  As it was unclear to the Court what would have happened at trial if defense counsel had pressed the discrepancy in the victim's statements about his age at the time of the incident, the Court reversed and remanded for a new trial.

State v. Johnson, 2012 UT 68 (Justice Durham)

Johnson pled guilty to unlawful sexual activity with a minor, a third degree felony, and enticing a minor, a class A misdemeanor.  As part of the plea agreement, the State pledged not to oppose a reduction in both convictions under Utah Code § 76-3-402 upon successful completion of probation.

During the probationary period, Section 402 was amended to was amended to disallow a reduction in conviction for any person required to register as a sex offender until the registration requirements expire.  Upon successful completion of Johnson's probation, the trial court denied his motion for a reduction under the new version of the statute.

The Utah Supreme Court reversed.  The Court held that eligibility for a reduction in a conviction was a substantive and not a procedural right, and that right vested at the time of sentencing.  The Court further held that the amendment to section 402 could not apply retroactively because the legislature made no express declaration of retroactivity, and the amendment was not passed to correct any interpretation of section 402 by the Court.

Carter v. State, 2012 UT 69 (Justice Durham)

In a successive petition for relief from a conviction and sentence for capital murder, Carter made numerous claims which had already been litigated or could have been, but were not, raised in prior proceedings.  Although the Post Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA) had been amended in 2008 to eliminate common law exceptions to the procedural bars on such claims, the Court considered the common law exceptions because the successive petition had been filed prior to the 2008 amendment.

The Court held, however, that none of Carter's claims fell under the common law exceptions.  Carter had not made the threshold showing, required under common law exceptions, that his new claims were not withheld in prior proceedings for tactical reasons, or that his previously litigated claims should be considered for good cause or unusual circumstances.  The Court further held that Carter could not revive any of his claims under ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel, as he had failed to meet either prong of the Strickland standard.

State v. Harris, 2012 UT 77 (Justice Lee)

Harris was convicted of assault, a class B misdemeanor, and brought a Batson challenge based on the State's use of a peremptory strike to remove the only minority juror in the venire.  The Utah Supreme Court held that the challenge was waived when defense counsel failed to fulfill his "absolute obligation" to notify the court that a resolution was needed before the jury venire was dismissed.  Although defense counsel raised a timely objection to the State's peremptory challenge, counsel made no further objection when the judge delayed ruling and responded "it is, your honor," to the judge's inquiry about whether the jury announced was the one he had selected.

State v. Nguyen, 2012 UT 80 (Justice Parrish)

Nguyen was convicted of multiple sex offenses involving a child.  The trial court admitted, in part under Utah R. Crim. P. 15.5(1), a redacted video-recording of an interview with the child at the Children's Justice Center.  The trial court ruled that the interview met the requirements of the rule in that it was reliable and its admission was in the interest of justice.  However, the trial court did not make a separate finding of good cause to admit the interview.

Citing to the phrase "for good cause" in Rule 15.5, Nguyen appealed the trial court's conclusion that a separate finding of good cause was not required.  Nguyen argued that the phrase "for good cause" precluded the admission of a child's recorded statements unless the child was unavailable or incapable of testifying.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.

The Utah Supreme Court also affirmed.  The Court held that good cause is satisfied where the trial court determines that the factors specified in Rule 15.5 are met.  "Good cause" is not the equivalent of "need," and no need analysis is necessary under the Rule.  The Court further held that the language of the rule precluded Nguyen's argument as to unavailability or incapacity of the child, because the rule already requires the child to be available to testify; or, if the court determines the child is unavailable, that the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the child concerning the statement.

Finally, the Court held that Rule 15.5 strikes an appropriate balance between a criminal defendant's constitutional right to confrontation, and the policy interests in providing the most accurate testimony to the trier of fact and protecting child victims from the trauma of testifying in court.

Winward v. State, 2012 UT 85 (Justice Parrish)

Winward filed a petition under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA) more than ten years after expiration of the PCRA's one-year statute of limitations.  He argued, however, that application of the statute of limitations would violate the Utah Constitution based on language in Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46, suggesting that the Court retained constitutional authority to remedy an "egregious injustice" despite the PCRA's procedural bars.

After dismissing unpreserved constitutional and common law claims, the Court outlined a framework for considering a claim of exception to the PCRA's procedural bars: 1) the defendant must demonstrate that he had a reasonable justification for missing the deadline and a meritorious defense; 2) the defendant must then fully brief the particulars of the exception he seeks; and 3) the defendant must demonstrate why the particular facts of his case qualify for such an exception.  The Court held that Winward had failed to present a reasonable justification for filing his petition more than ten years after the statute of limitations expired, or demonstrate the merit of his claims, and therefore declined to consider whether any "egregious injustice" exception to the PCRA's procedural bars exists.

However, the Court held that Winward may have had a claim for relief under the newly announced rule in the U.S. Supreme Court decisions Missouri v. Frye and Lafler v. Cooper regarding ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea bargaining process.  The Court vacated the trial court's dismissal of Winward's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea bargaining process, and remanded so Winward could file a motion to amend or vacate his sentence under Utah Code § 78B-9-104(1)(f), which allows for post-conviction relief after announcement of a new U.S. Supreme Court rule.

Ross v. State, 2012 UT 93 (Chief Justice Durrant)

During Ross's trial for aggravated murder, trial counsel stated in an in-chambers conference that he and Ross had elected to forego an extreme emotional distress defense for evidentiary reasons known to both of them.  The trial judge confirmed this with Ross.  As part of his petition for post-conviction relief, Ross alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to present an extreme emotional distress defense, and ineffective assistance of appeal counsel for failure to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  The PCRA court granted summary judgment to the State on both claims based on the in-chambers conference.

The Utah Supreme Court reversed.  The Court held that trial counsel's statements during the in-chambers conference were confusing and demonstrated that counsel may not have understood the nature of the defense or how it would have applied to Ross.  It was also unclear from counsel's and Ross's statements whether counsel had adequately explained the defense to Ross.  Furthermore, trial counsel presented no defense or jury instructions, and apparently did not investigate any potential emotional distress at the time of the killing.  This, coupled with genuine issues of material fact regarding whether appeal counsel investigated the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, led the Court to reverse the PCRA court's grant of summary judgment.

State v. Simons, 2013 UT 3 (Justice Parrish)

A sheriff's deputy pulled over a car for speeding, and after questioning the driver determined that the driver was impaired.  The deputy asked the driver to exit the vehicle, and as he did so the deputy observed, in the driver's side door compartment, baggies that had been chewed on and contained a white crystal residue.  The deputy then asked the passenger, Simons, whether he had anything illegal on his person.  Simons replied that he had a methamphetamine pipe in his underwear, and at the deputy's command he shook it out.  Simons subsequently admitted to having methamphetamine and was arrested.  Simons filed a motion to suppress alleging an illegal search and seizure.  The trial court denied the motion.

The Utah Supreme Court affirmed.  The Court held that Simons's initial detention was justified because of the need to investigate the speeding violation by the driver.  The Court further held that the deputy's questioning of Simons was supported by reasonable suspicion based on the deputy's suspicion that the driver was impaired and the presence of drug paraphernalia in plain view.  The Court further held that the deputy's single question to Simons during the stop concerning his potential possession of contraband was a de minimis extension of an otherwise lawful detention, and did not unconstitutionally extend the detention.  The Court reiterated, however, that once a stop is concluded, police must demonstrate reasonable suspicion for even a de minimis extension.