At every preliminary hearing in the State of Utah, the State is required to present sufficient evidence that the crime charged has been committed, and that the Defendant committed it. The magistrate overseeing the hearing must find that there is believable evidence of all the elements of the crime charged. This evidentiary burden is known as “probable cause.” If the magistrate does not find probable cause, the magistrate does not bind the case over for trial. State v. Maughan , 2012 UT App 121, presents a rare set of facts in which a magistrate declined to bind a case over for trial because there was no believable evidence of intent presented at the preliminary hearing.
Maughan was a witness in a 20-year-old murder case, and made statements to police that implicated him as an accomplice to the murder. Maughan was then charged with capital murder as a co-defendant. After being charged, Maughan disobeyed several court orders to speak with police again and to testify at his co-defendant’s trial. Although Maughan had been granted use immunity in connection with his testimony, he steadfastly maintained that the protections granted by such immunity would not be sufficient to protect his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.
Maughan was called as a witness at his co-defendant’s trial, but refused to answer any questions. He was subsequently acquitted at his own trial of capital murder. The State then charged Maughan with obstruction of justice, alleging, among other things, that Maughan refused to speak to police or testify with the specific intent to hinder the investigation and prosecution of his co-defendant.
At preliminary hearing on the obstruction of justice charge, the magistrate declined to bind the case over for trial, holding that the State had failed to demonstrate probable cause on the specific intent element of obstruction of justice. Rather, the magistrate ruled that the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence was that Maughan refused to testify out of concern for protecting his privilege against self-incrimination, and not out of any desire to hinder the prosecution of his co-defendant.
The State appealed. It argued to the Court of Appeals that, contrary to the ruling of the trial court, the only reasonable inference from the evidence was that Maughan had acted with specific intent. The State argued that this inference was appropriate because the natural consequence of Maughan’s action was the hindrance of the co-defendant’s prosecution (although the co-defendant was convicted at trial even without Maughan’s testimony), and that Maughan had a motive because he had formerly been friends with the co-defendant.
The Court of Appeals rejected both the magistrate’s and the State’s absolute arguments about the inferences to be derived from the evidence at preliminary hearing, but ultimately agreed that “the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the totality of the evidence [was] that Maughan acted in his own self-interest to preserve his ability to defend against the capital murder charge.” In its thorough and systematic review of the preliminary hearing bindover standard, the Court noted that if probable cause is to be supported by inferences from the evidence, those inferences must be reasonable inferences, and not merely speculation
Although the Court acknowledged that there was some evidence which, in isolation, could have arguably supported an inference that Maughan intended to hinder the prosecution of the co-defendant (mainly Maughan’s former friendship with the co-defendant), in light of the other evidence this inference was reduced to mere speculation. The Court pointed out, as the trial court did, that Maughan was fully cooperative with police until the time that he was also charged with capital murder, and only after that time did he refuse to cooperate with police or testify. The Court also noted Maughan’s numerous objections to testifying, all of which were based on Maughan’s concerns for protecting his own constitutional rights and preserving his ability to defend against capital murder at trial.
Maughan is an important opinion for many reasons, not the least of which being that it upholds a magistrate’s decision to refuse to bind a case over for trial, which is a rare event. However, even rarer than that is the fact that the magistrate found probable cause for every element of the crime except the intent element. Thus, Maughan is a critical case for defense attorneys to know. In a world in which the scope of evidentiary rules is ever-expanding to allow the use of character and other bad acts evidence to prove intent, defense attorneys must be ever vigilant in putting the State to its constitutionally-mandated duty of proving every element of the crimes it is charging~
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